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COMMENT
DIVERSIFYING THE JUDICIARY: THE INFLUENCE OF
GENDER AND RACE ON JUDGING
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, political scientist Beverly Blair Cook wrote Women
Judges: The End of Tokenism for a publication of the National
Center for State Courts. She observed that the "national pro-
portion of women judges has matched the national proportion of
women lawyers on a time lag basis."' She compared the num-
ber of women law graduates with the number of women judges,
finding that in the 1960s, women composed 1-2% of the legal
profession and accounted for 1-2% of judges. With women repre-
senting 4% of all law graduates in the 1960s, the number of
women judges increased to 4% in the 1970s.2 Cook predicted
that with 15% of law classes in the 1970s estimated to be wom-
en, 15% of judges would be women in the 1980s, and that
states with a large number of women lawyers employed in the
1970s would almost achieve full sex integration by the year
2000.
3
Time has proven Cook's predictions overly optimistic. Accord-
ing to comprehensive state court statistics, by 1985 well below
10% of judges were women.4 By 1988, only 81 out of 833 state
1. Beverly B. Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 84, 84 (Winifred L. Hepperle & Laura Crites eds., 1978).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 84-85.
4. Letter from Larry L. Sipes, President, National Center for State Courts, to
Sue Smith, University of Richmond Law Review 1 (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with au-
thor) (citing FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS FOR WOMEN AND MINORI-
179
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
intermediate appellate judges were women, slightly less than
10%.' In 1991, 36 out of 356 judges in state courts of last re-
sort were women, only slightly more than 10%.6 The distribu-
tion in the federal judiciary is equally bleak. By 1989, of 2618
authorized federal judicial positions, women held only 216, or
8%. As the chart in Appendix I illustrates,' in 1993, out of
the 837 Article III active, lifetime positions in the federal ju-
diciary, only 93, or 11.1%, are women.
These numbers are disturbingly low when considering that
13% of lawyers in 1984 were women,9 and that women have
been graduating from law school in steadily increasing num-
bers. In 1982, 35% of law graduates were women.'0 If Cook's
correlation between law school graduates and women judges
had held true, during the 1990s, over one-third of all judges
would be women. In 1990, 43% of law classes were women.
11
It is likely that there will be an ever increasing pool of women
lawyers qualified to sit on the bench. Cook was assuming that
this would be the case, and she was right, yet women judges
still provide only token representation. 2
As the national judiciary has remained predominantly male,
it has also remained predominantly white. In 1991, the total
number of black judges was 895.8 Of these, 822 serve on state
courts, representing an increase of 14% from 1986.'4 At the
federal level there has actually been a significant decrease in
TIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS (1985)).
5. Id. (citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, DIRECTORY OF STATE COURTS, JUDG-
ES, & CLERKS (2d ed. 1988).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Alliance for Justice, 1993 (please see Appendix I).
9. SUSAN G. MEZEY, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY, WOMEN, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS 194 (1992).
10. Different Voices, Different Choices? The Impact of More Women Lawyers and
Judges on the Justice System, 74 JUDICATURE 138, 140 (1990) [hereinafter Different
Voices].
11. Id. at 138.
12. Rosalie E. Wahl, Some Reflections on Women and the Judiciary, 4 LAW &
INEQ. J. 153, 154 (1986).
13. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES & THE JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF THE NATL BAR ASS'N, ELECTED AND APPOINTED BLACK JUDGES IN THE UNITED
STATES 1991, 5 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter BLACK JUDGES].
14. Id. However, a fewer number of states have black judges than in 1986. Id.
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the number of black judges, from 99 in 1986 to 73 in 1991."5
The chart reflects that blacks hold 42 of the 837 Article III
active, lifetime positions in the federal judiciary, of which 7 are
women. Nationally, the total number of black women judges
has increased from 140 in 1986 to 204 in 1991, an increase of
46%.16
Obviously, there is a long way to go to achieve meaningful,
not merely token, diversification. The lack of progress can be
partially explained by the political climate of the past decade,
especially when looking at statistics at the federal level. The
process by which federal judges are chosen"' has become high-
ly politicalized. 8 The Executive Branch has great power to
influence the composition of the judiciary. 9
When comparing the number of women law school graduates
and women judges in 1978, Cook was not counting on the Rea-
gan-Bush era. At the time of her writing, President Jimmy
Carter was calling for greater diversification of the federal
bench.20 Of his 258 nominations, Carter nominated 40 (15.5%)
women and 55 (21.3%) minorities.2' During his term, 38
(14.7%) black judges were appointedY
15. Id. at 6. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas had not yet been confirmed.
16. Id. at 5. This is one of the few statistics offered that distinguishes black
women. Unfortunately, most statistics do not, so we do not know if double counting
or single counting is occurring. Apparently, those compiling the statistics do not think
a separate category is warranted, which probably exemplifies' what Angela Harris
calls "gender essentialism" and "racial essentialism." See Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
17. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States .... " U.S. CONST.
art. II § 2.
18. Some view this as a major problem with the process. See, e.g., Orrin G.
Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 35 (1989); Patricia M. Wald,
Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & POL.
15, 22 (1989) (discussing how politicalization may be unavoidable). Certainly the
"I homas-Hill" hearings have intensified attention on the process.
19. Former President Reagan and President Bush appointed 60% of the sitting
federal judiciary. See Michael P. Williams, Clinton's Win Won't End Fight for Civil
Rights, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1992, at B1.
20. See generally Charles Halpern & Ann Macrory, Choosing Judges, N.Y. TImES,
July 1, 1979, at E21 (editorial discussing Carter's appointments).
21. Patrick Leahy, Reflections on Federal Judicial Selection, 6 J.L. & PoL. 25, 28
(1989).
22. BLACK JUDGES, supra note 13, at 7.
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In contrast, out of President Reagan's 379 appointments, 31
(8.2%) were women and 7 (1.8%) were black.' President Bush
appointed more than 200 judges, and only 13 were black.24
These track records underscore the impact of political realities
on the judiciary, regardless of what other factors may influence
the question of diversity. Regarding the decline in the number
of black federal judges, it has been recognized that three suc-
cessive Republican presidential victories and consistent black
support for the Democratic ticket may explain why few black
candidates were appointed. 5 While the debate over increased
politicization of the judiciary is relevant, further elaboration is
beyond the scope of this inquiry. This inquiry begins, after a
sobering introduction, by asking what is wrong with a judiciary
dominated by white males? Statistics are just numbers, and
after all, judges are impartial, bound by the law, rules of proce-
dure, and by precedent-right? Why would a judge's gender and
race make a difference? This article attempts to answer these
questions.
Part II posits that a judge's perspective, influenced by factors
such as gender and race, is a critical factor in his or her role as
an adjudicator. The judge is an individual, with notions of fair-
ness and justice, who stands in relation to those being judged.
Part III discusses the intersection of gender and race with
impartiality and morality in judging, examining whether, and
how, they might intersect. Part IV addresses the representa-
tional and substantive importance of diversification of the judi-
ciary, finally tackling the question of whether any measurable
differences may be manifested. Part V concludes that the in-
creased presence of different perspectives on the bench will
positively impact decisionmaking, but only if true, rather than
token, diversity is achieved.
II. A JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATOR
Judges are required to be impartial, independent, and disen-
gaged by the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
23. Leahy, supra note 21, at 28.
24. See Williams, supra note 19, at B1-B2.
25. BLACK JUDGES, supra note 13, at 7.
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Conduct26 and the United States Code." These uniform at-
tributes are designed to ensure that the judge will not pre-
judge parties in disputes and will apply the law neutrally.
Though existing perhaps as ideals to which judges must contin-
ually strive, these uniform attributes do not define a "judge."
A. Who Is a Judge
A judge is an individual. "Who" that judge is depends on
where he or she is from, how he or she was raised, instilled
values, life experiences, gender, race, ethnicity and a host of
other factors. These factors will define an individual's culture
and shape an individual's perspective.
When an individual ascends the bench, his or her perspec-
tive, shaped since childhood, is not left behind. As Kenneth
Karst has noted, it is unrealistic to ask a judge to leave accul-
turation at home: "We might as well ask that the judge leave
'his or her own self at home."' Gender and race are important
aspects of acculturation, and they continue to influence people
throughout their lives. All women" and men of color, the
disempowered groups in society, continue throughout their lives
to be affected by their often unequal treatment in that society.
For example, when Sandra Day O'Connor became the first
woman Supreme Court Justice, she probably did not forget that
when she graduated at the top of her Stanford Law School
class in 1952, she was offered a job as a legal secretary. ° The
fact that she had a law degree did not make a difference to the
employer. As a law school graduate, she did not fit patriarchal
society's definition of "woman.""1 The employers operated with-
in a paradigm which did not recognize female attorneys.
26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
27. 28 U.S.C-. § 455 (West 1992).
28. Kenneth B. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1957
(1988).
29. Throughout this article the term "women" is inclusive of women of all races.
30. Different Voices, supra note 10, at 138.
31. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803, 808 (1990) (arguing that "woman" is a socially constructed category defined by
men).
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When Paulette Brown, the only black woman graduate from
Seton Hall Law School in 1976, became a municipal judge in
New Jersey, she probably did not forget she was harassed so
much about her race that she quit her second corporate law
job." Probably no white male attorney has ever been mistaken
for a court reporter at a deposition, yet Muzette Hill, a black
woman attorney, has been so mistaken at every deposition she
ever attended.33 These black women not only contradicted
society's definition of "woman," but society's definition of people
of color as well.34
These are but a few examples of the various experiences of
individuals where one's gender, or race, or both, functioned as
determinant factors.35 Critical to these examples is the percep-
tion of the people meeting these women. More than exercising
individual judgment, these people were reacting to intrusions
into their paradigm. They were content with the set of rules
that defined their view of the world, and in their view neither
white women nor women of color were supposed to be attor-
neys. Their reactions were a manifestation of the tension creat-
ed when the paradigm encountered these women.
While focusing primarily on gender and race, these examples
are only of educated professionals, whose experiences are still
quite different than those of different socioeconomic status.
Although various factors may compel different reactions from
people, these factors represent multiple layers of an individual.
These various factors, then, combine to determine a person's
vantage point in society, and it is this combination of factors
which will then wear a robe.
32. Nina Burleigh, Black Women Lawyers: Coping with Dual Discrimination,
A.B.AL J., June 1988, at 64.
33. Id.
34. Racial categories may also be viewed as social constructs. Cain, supra note
31, at 808 n.20.
35. For black women, neither gender nor race alone can be a determining factor.
See Harris, supra note 16 at 604 (explaining that the black woman's experience is




B. Perspective as Affecting Notions of Fairness and Justice
Important in this article's analysis is that one's perspective
influences perceptions of what is fair and just. Fern Smith,
District Court Judge for the Northern District of California,
commented on the concepts of fairness and justice." She dis-
counted gender as a factor, saying that women do not look at
fairness and justice any differently than men. 7 Yet, at the
same time, she does "think that ethnicity and race and socio-
economic status change people's perception of fairness and jus-
tice. 3 s
Judge Smith also noted, that the presence of women in the
legal profession expands the application of justice and fairness,
observing that there are now causes of action such as date rape
and sexual harassment that were unheard of ten years ago. 9
This observation is certainly valid, not only regarding causes of
action but emerging legal standards as well. For example, the
relatively new "reasonable woman" test is changing how some
courts view sex discrimination claims. 0 It has been observed
that women judges generally view sex discrimination cases
differently than men, and this may significantly impact deci-
sional output.4 With more women judges using this standard,
its application may be expanded, resulting in more verdicts for
female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases.42
36. Different Voices, supra note 10, at 144-46. Judge Smith's comments were
made during a panel discussion at the American Judicature Society's annual meeting
on August 3, 1990. Id.
37. Id. at 145.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Re-
fining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
For a discussion of these cases and the impact of the "reasonable woman" standard,
see Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law-Will It
Really Make a Difference? 26 IND. L. REV. 227 (1993).
41. See Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference, 73 JUDI-
CATURE 204 (1990).
42. Toni Lester analyzed five sex discrimination cases using the reasonable person
test in which the female plaintiff lost. Lester applied the "reasonable woman' test to
these cases, and concluded that four out of the five plaintiffs may have won their
cases if this standard had been used. Lester, supra note 40, at 229-30, 247-57.
1993] 185
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
While the increased presence of women in the judiciary will
affect gender-specific issues, it will also affect issues not related
to women. Gender cannot be discarded as a factor which does
not influence one's perception of fairness and justice. Fern
Smith's analysis discussed above underestimates the importance
of gender in our patriarchal society, and how a feminine per-
spective might influence many neutral, or traditionally male-
oriented issues.' Her analysis also requires that women of
color peel away their gender in order for their race to exert its
influence on perception. Similarly, women of differing
ethnicities and socioeconomic status would have to shed their
gender when developing perceptions of fairness and justice.
Perception is influenced by all factors which constitute an
individual's reality; omitting gender from the analysis is impos-
sible," because justice is not a concrete, static concept. Rather,
"justice is created by, and defeated by, people who have gen-
ders, races, ethnicities, [and] religions."45
In addition, there are different pathways to the bench which
may influence the perspective of a judge. Most white male judg-
es are prosperous, having risen through the ranks in a tradi-
tional fashion, while many women and men of color have taken
non-traditional routes. For example, during President Carter's
administration, the white male candidates were more likely to
have private law firm careers, ties to the local community and
the appropriate political contributions. They were also more
likely to receive higher preconfirmation ratings from the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA).4" The non-traditional candidates
were younger, less affluent, and came from the types of careers
historically open to them, such as public interest practice.47 It
was observed that these types of career paths are "deemed less
43. See Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 159, 165
(1986).
44. Multiple consciousness theorists developed this idea. See generally Harris,
supra note 16; Marie J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness
as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989).
45. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreward: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14 (1987).
46. Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal




worthy" by the ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary which
rates nominees.4"
Although Carter did nominate some non-traditional candi-
dates, he was criticized for allowing lawyers with political con-
nections to be chosen frequently over outstanding public inter-
est lawyers.49 Public interest lawyers are more likely to recog-
nize the experience of the disadvantaged groups in our society,
and they may have a different notion of fairness, and perhaps
justice. Their perspective, at any rate, would be very different.
They would have been close to many outsiders in our society,
who themselves would have a particular idea of what justice
is.50
C. The Relationship of Different Vantage Points
1. A Starting Point
Our legal system is founded on liberal ideas of neutrality,
objectivity, and universal truth. Objective rules are constructed,
which can then be applied neutrally to subsequent cases. In
order to do this, similarities and differences of groups must be
discerned, and relevant differences identified, which requires
abstracting the similarities.51 According to Ann Scales, the ba-
sis of the approach to rulemaking in our system is "abstract
48. See Carl Tobias, Comment, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 175 (1990) (analyzing President Bush's appointments at mid-
term).
49. See Halpern & Macrory, supra note 20, at E21. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, "a lead-
ing women's rights advocate," was among those candidates the editorial cited as being
overlooked by President Carter. Now, fourteen years later, she is the second woman
named to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
50. See Matsuda, supra note 44, at 8. Matsuda discusses the concept of justice in
communities of color, observing that
[niot much time is wasted in those communities arguing over definitions
of justice. Justice means children will[sic] full bellies sleeping in warm
beds under clean sheets. Justice means no lynchings, no rapes. Justice
means access to a livelihood. It means control over one's own body.
These kinds of concrete and substantive visions of justice flow naturally
from the experience of oppression.
Id.
51. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1377 (1986).
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universality,"52 which "made maleness the norm ... all in the
name of neutrality.""3 White males have constructed these "ob-
jective" rules. The legal system, and the law itself, has been
shaped by white males.54 One particular perspective has been
represented, calling into question whether neutral standards
could be achieved,55 even as they may claim to be neutral.5
When studying the effect women and men of color might
have upon entering the judiciary, the threshold question is one
of timing. It is easy to focus on those who are only recently
entering an established structure, shaking the status quo, ver-
sus those who entered in the formative stages of the system
shaping its growth. Even though white males have been and
remain the majority on the bench, "[tihe comfort of finding
one's perspective widely shared does not make it any less a
perspective."5" Any changes made by more women and men of
color serving as judges can only be understood within the
framework of the existing structure. As judges, they are only
different because they are compared to the predominantly white
male institution.' From this departure point, we can then look
at the interplay of multiple perspectives in a courtroom.
2. Relationship to the Judged
Providing every party who comes before the court with a fair
hearing and ensuring that justice is served are the laudable
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 892-93 (1989).
55. See Iris M. Young, Difference and Policy: Some Reflections in the Context of
New Social Movements, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 535, 538 (1987) (arguing that while stan-
dards may claim to be neutral, they actually tend to be biased toward privileged
groups).
56. See generally Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of
Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 64 (1985). According to Wishik,
law is not ungendered and legitimates patriarchy by "masking and by giving an ap-
pearance of neutrality to, the maleness of the institution it serves." Id. at 66.
57. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 63 (1990).
58. Minow, supra note 45, at 13. Minow explains that "[wiomen are compared to
the unstated norm of men, 'minority' races to whites, handicapped persons to the
able-bodied, and 'minority' religions to 'majorities." Id. See also Cain, supra note 31,
at 809-10 (observing that maleness goes unstated when men describe themselves, yet
women often list gender).
188 [Vol. 28:179
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goals our judicial system tries to achieve. Judges play a critical
role adjudicating disputes. The people entering the courts are
from various backgrounds with differing life experiences. They
too have perspectives. For example, in a landlord-tenant dis-
pute, the landlord will usually have a significantly different
background from the tenant; they will have different life
stories.
Not only will adversarial parties often have different life
experiences from each other, but so too in relation to the judge.
Considering the large majority of federal judges appointed are
prosperous, white, Anglo males, Karst has concluded that they
"will have a picture of reality that differs markedly from the
pictures carried around by a large proportion of the people
being judged: women, poor people, or people of another race,
ethnicity, or religion."59
Of course the judge will not always have a different back-
ground than the litigants. The relationship of a judge's back-
ground to that of defendants in a criminal context provides an
interesting illustration of the influence of perspective. Criminal
defense lawyer, John B. Mitchell, discussing the frequent coer-
cion of guilty pleas from defendants, observed that our criminal
justice system functions differently depending on the class of
the defendant." Mitchell first observed that the system pri-
marily functions administratively, with 90% of cases decided
through plea bargaining. Thus most defendants are not afforded
the protections of the "full screening system" against abuses
and inaccuracies.6' Many of these defendants must settle for
plea bargaining because a disproportionate number of defen-
dants are poor members of the black community who lack the
political strength to challenge the coercion of pleas.62
He then contrasts this treatment of defendants with the
treatment that middle class white defendants received when
they invaded the system in the 1960's as a result of crackdowns
59. Karst, supra note 28, at 1958.
60. See John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New An-
swers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293, 317-18 (1980).
61. Id. at 313-14.
62. Id. at 318-19.
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on illegal demonstrators and marijuana users." Mitchell ob-
served that "[t]he power of the middle class protected its sons
and daughters," because when these defendants entered the
process, even very minor violations resulted in jury trials, and
in many instances, prosecutors dismissed cases at trial doubting
the defendant's guilt." Mitchell identified two sources of this
power: (1) "the personal identification which the judges and
prosecutors felt with these middle class defendants and their
families;" and (2) the middle class expectations of the operation
of the criminal justice system.65 This example illustrates that
judges' perspectives can result in differing treatment of defen-
dants, those with whom the judges readily identify and those
with whom they do not identify.
It is important for a judge to be aware of his or her own
point of view, since recognizing one's own point of view is the
first step towards recognizing the points of view of others. It
has been observed that "[o]nce we see that any point of view,
including one's own, is a point of view, we will realize that
every difference we see is seen in relation to something already
assumed as the starting point."6 Judges must then identify
the vantage points of others as well as their own.67 It will be
difficult for a judge to identify a voice with which he or she is
completely unfamiliar. Thus, as Karst notes, it may be too
much to ask for a judge to go as far as empathizing with the
parties, considering that a judge will encounter people "that his
culture has trained him to see as outsiders. 68
It is important, however, for those in the dominant group to
recognize that they have a particular point of view and learn to
identify other points of view. If dominant groups become aware
that their "experiences and ways of understanding social rela-
tions are particular, they can perhaps become more aware of
how their standards of authority, intelligence, reasonableness,
63. Id. at 318.
64. Id.
65. Id. Mitchell added that "no one involved" in the system "vas prepared to
disappoint" those expectations. Id.
66. Minow, supra note 45, at 15.
67. Id.
68. Karst, supra note 28, at 1965.
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creativity, and the like are colored by that experience."69 This
awareness may lead to the realization that there is no univer-
sal truth because it might become "increasingly difficult for
dominant groups to maintain their norms as neutral and uni-
versal, and to construct the values and behavior of the op-
pressed as deviant, perverted, or inferior.""
If we can ask a judge to identify different points of view, it is
not too much to ask that a judge see the parties as more than
mere abstractions. Detaching oneself from one's own perspective
in order to hear the other voices does not mean one must be
totally detached from the others.7 Independent judgment is
not sacrificed. In fact, one can only be independent if one is
willing to listen to a previously silenced voice. A judge must
stand back, yes, but only in order to listen to the stories of all
who come before him or her.
Empathic understanding is desirable, and achievable, from
this posture. First, however, a judge must break free from the
rigid explanations the traditional perceptions of the law impose.
The law has authoritatively shaped the understanding of
events, because it has a limited "concern over a narrow set of
explanations."72 Furthermore, the law also makes assumptions
concerning women which do not match the reality of women's
life situations.7 A judge should strive for a complete under-
standing of the stories of both parties, free from pre-determined
explanations or assumptions. Only then will he or she be able
to make an independent, informed decision, and only then will
all people entering a courtroom get the fair hearing we so lofti-
ly espouse, but do not always achieve.
69. See Young, supra note 55, at 541-42.
70. Id. at 542.
71. Scales has criticized the fact that the legal system clings to a lack of subjec-
tivity and impersonality. See Scales, supra note 51, at 1389. She maintains that "ob-
jective reality is a myth." Id. at 1378.
72. See Finley, supra note 54, at 889.
73. Wishik, supra note 56, at 73-74. Her concept can be applied to people of
color, about whom the law also makes assumptions.
1993]
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III. THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER AND RACE AND
IMPARTIALITY AND MORALITY IN JUDGING
In attempting to maintain independence, a judge is charged
with remaining impartial throughout court proceedings. Ad-
versarial parties to a dispute, and parties seeking either an
equitable or a legal result, have a right to expect a fair hearing
by an impartial decisionmaker. They have a right to be
heard.74 The judge must identify with the litigants7" equally,
that is, impartially. And although a judge must be impartial he
or she is nevertheless a participant, for at some stage the judge
will prefer one side over another. Judges, as adjudicators, must
make choices, and occasionally moral judgments. The judge will
then have to struggle with his or her own morality, legislated
or majority morality, and whether an unpopular decision is
nonetheless morally correct.
A. Judicial Impartiality and Decisionmaking
It is nearly impossible to discuss impartiality without first
considering the role of attitude, or perspective of the judge.
Recognizing that a judge has a particular perspective does not
negate the element of impartiality in judicial proceedings. Far
from being mutually 'exclusive concepts, acknowledging one's
own perspective actually enhances the possibility of an impar-
tial hearing. If that critical step of acknowledgement does not
occur, the perspective can influence the behavior of the judge
without any conscious recognition.76 Furthermore, while a
judge may believe he or she is being objective, the stance taken
may actually seem partial from another's point of view.77
74. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Ap-
pointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: Hearing Women,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1333, 1334-35 (1992) (comparing what she terms the inability of
some members of the Senate to hear Anita Hill with what she maintains routinely
occurs in courts-judges failing to listen to or hear women).
75. Identification is preferable to abstraction because Scales believes abstraction
insulates the status quo when institutionalized. Scales, supra note 51, at 1385.
76. Minow uses cases of racial and religious discrimination to show what she be-
lieves to be the "oppressive" impact of the observer's unacknowledged perspective.




There will usually be several different vantage points repre-
sented in the courtroom, and to be impartial, a judge must
realize this. Moreover, there will, in most cases, come a time
when a choice must be made favoring one side or the other. 8
It is the judge's job as adjudicator to decide which of the repre-
sented vantage points to adopt. 9 This is the nature of the pro-
cess. Judges are asked to make judgments.
Impartiality is intertwined with the process of
decisionmaking. How a judge arrives at a particular decision is
vital to understanding his or her role in relation to those being
judged. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, each with a
specific set of facts to which the law is app ied in order to
reach an outcome. During this process the jud e will, in many
instances, have the opportunity to exercise discr tion; there will
either be no set rule or the rule will specifically ,uthorize dis-
cretion. When a judge is called upon to fashion --equitable
remedy or decide a novel case, here too, he or she will exercise
discretion.
In discussing the common law and impartiality, it was ob-
served that in cases with no clearly applicable precedent, "per-,
sonality-based, attitudinal and other subtler forms of prejudice
are not so easily shrugged off."0 If, then, impartiality is called
into question, so too is the effect of factors such as gender,
race, and the overall attitude of the judge. In novel cases, "the
court will ask simply: what does justice require in a case such
as this?"8 ' As previously discussed, notions of justice may vary
between individuals. Gender and race are factors which may
impact how one defines justice, and, therefore, the result in a
given case may be influenced by them.
Frequently, the judge is not permitted to exercise discretion
and must apply a rule or law as the legislature has mandated.
The substantive outcome of the case is determined by the law,
and a judge may apply uniform reasoning to reach the decision.
Judges will also sometimes feel bound by precedent. However,
78. H. K Lucke, The Common Law: Judicial Impartiality and Judge-Made Law,
98 LAw Q. REV. 29, 48 (1982).
79. Minow, supra note 45, at 15.
80. Lucke, supra note 78, at 49.
81. Id. at 52.
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in the process of evaluating the facts, a judge may distinguish
certain facts from those in previous cases, and reach a different
result. "
A significant example of when a previous rule of law may be
distinguished occurs when the judge determines that "the rele-
vant social and legal environment prevailing at the time of the
first dispute ... has changed.""3 This determination might be
made because the judge recognizes society has changed and sets
a standard to comport with evolving society. Today, many prob-
lems recognized as legitimate causes of action are related to
gender or race. Perhaps the relatively new members of the
judiciary, women and men of color, are more familiar with
many of the problems and issues being presented and litigated
in our courtrooms, and perhaps they would be more likely to
distinguish existing law. A member of the establishment, on the
other hand, may be resistant to change. Connection with the
judged, or the lack thereof, will affect the evaluation of the
facts.84
Clearly, impartiality is not an abstract principle rigidly deter-
mining behavior. As Karst has commented:
The impartiality we can fairly demand is not devotion to
some self-applying principle that eliminates judgment from
judging. Rather it is an effort to decide the case from an
independent standpoint, as opposed to the point of view of
one of the parties, and to approach all parties' contending
positions with sympathetic regard."
Thus, openness to the views of outsiders and a willingness to
listen to everyone's stories actually fosters impartiality in
decisiomnaking.
82. "It is an open secret that judges have a good deal of choice in the way in
which they apply the case law, that they are prone to 'distinguish' even the most
closely similar precedent if they feel strongly that it tends toward a undesirable re-
sult." Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Karst, supra note 28, at 1962.
85. Id. at 1966.
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B. Morality in Judging
The judge, from an independent standpoint, will listen to the
stories presented to him or her, balance the interests, and even-
tually favor one side or the other. The next question is how did
that judge arrive at that particular conclusion? When discussing
cases in law school, the reasoning of the judge is usually ana-
lyzed. The process of evaluating the facts and applying the law
to the facts is studied. Rarely, if ever, is the role of morality in
decisionmaking discussed.
The simplest form of legal reasoning used in common law
cases is an "analogous application of a precedent or of a
precedential rule."86 The application of the precedent to the
facts yields a particular result. In some cases, however, moral
intuition is relied upon to reach a conclusion." It is legitimate
for judges to rely on their own moral values, because if they do
not, the ethical quality of the law "could not have changed
and/or improved in the course of time."' It is important, then,
to study moral reasoning as applied to factual situations.
The role of morality in judging is a highly philosophical in-
quiry, but it is important to note that gender and race are
aspects of that inquiry. They are factors which may influence
one's own sense of morality. They are also significant factors in
determining a community's morality and they may affect how
one chooses between conflicting moralities. According to Patricia
Wald, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, many of the issues judges are
now deciding are highly visible moral issues-abortion, homo-
sexuality, the homeless, and remedies for racial inequality. 9
Most of these issues are related to gender or race, or both,
which may pose moral dilemmas for judges of different back-
grounds."
86. Lucke, supra note 78, at 65.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 67.
89. Patricia M. Wald, The Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman Judges' Perspec-
tive, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 3, 4 (1986).
90. See, e.g., Charles Malarkey, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation
Cause in California? 41 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 696 (1990) (discussing the opportunity for
a judge to decide the rights of a group to which the judge belongs).
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Gender and race may influence how individuals identify and
solve moral dilemmas. For instance, Carol Gilligan has provided
strong evidence that women deal with moral conflicts differently
than men." She found that males use images of hierarchy in
structuring relationships, while females use a web of intercon-
nected relationships, leading to different views of morality.2
She illuminated the possibility that men and women see moral
dilemmas differently, without labeling one method "better" than
the other. Thus, individuals may develop differing moral
values. 3
The concept of a majority or conventional morality may also
be affected by gender and race. Conventional morality is de-
fined by the popularly elected legislative and executive branch-
es.94 Judge Wald describes how morality influences constitu-
tional issues and notes the danger in being tied to the moral
values of the Framers or the majority when judges must en-
force individual rights.95 Certainly, the Framers did not write
the Constitution with women and men of color in mind, and
popularly elected legislatures are dominated by privileged white
males.96 She concludes that there are times when judges must
transcend conventional morality and call upon their own per-
sonal morality, as well as the underlying aspirations and ideals
of our national history." Judge Wald speaks from experience,
and her analysis can be expanded beyond constitutional issues
to all areas of the law.
IV. THE RAMIFICATION OF DIVERSITY
This article has discussed gender and race and how they
might impact perspective, impartiality and morality in judging.
The extent of the role of these elusive concepts in judging itself
is difficult to measure, let alone the extent to which gender and
91. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMAN's DEVELOPMENT 33 (1982).
92. Id. at 62.
93. Id. at 62-63.
94. Wald, supra note 89, at 9.
95. Id. at 9-11.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 15.
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race may influence these concepts. Certainly, there are experi-
ential differences between white males, women and minorities.
This last part addresses whether including more women in the
judiciary would have concrete effects on judicial decisionmaking
and policy. First, it will account for the most obvious symbolic
effects based on the increased representation of groups other
than white males. Then, it will discuss whether there may be
any substantive ramifications.
A. Representation of Women and Men of Color
The judiciary is an important institution which remains dom-
inated by white males of similar backgrounds. As a social insti-
tution, the judiciary perpetuates gender and race-based stereo-
types, myths and biases. It is important for women, and men of
color, to gain representation in this powerful institution. It is a
question of power and status, of empowering segments of soci-
ety and permanently eliminating those stereotypes, myths and
biases. Rosalie Wahl, Associate Justice of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, believes that "[any lasting change in the position
of women in our society will be reflected in greater numbers of
women beyond the level of tokenism in the judiciary and in the
legal profession. " " The same holds for the increased represen-
tation of minorities.
The importance of increasing the number of women in the
judiciary should not be underestimated. The increase in sym-
bolic representation will substantially eliminate stereotypes,
myths and biases. Some black women lawyers support the "crit-
ical mass" theory which alleviates problems by numbers alone:
as more black women enter the profession, they become less of
a phenomenon.99 Associate Justice Wahl believes that enough
women are now in the legal profession and on the bench to
form a critical mass which can act as a catalyst.' She as-
serts that women who have achieved status and power have a
duty to support other women.'0 ' Thus, numbers alone can be
98. Wahl, supra note 12, at 154-55.
99. See, e.g., Burleigh, supra note 31, at 68.
100. Wahl, supra note 12, at 156.
101. Id.
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a catalyst for change by further increasing the representation of
women, and men of color.
Diversifying the judiciary will reflect the diversity in the
population and those affected by judicial decisions. The judicia-
ry is a highly visible institution, and the racial and gender
composition of the bench affect perceptions of that institu-
tion. °2 Some, such as Governor Weld of Massachusetts, sup-
port diversification, recognizing it is important to the quality of
justice that the judiciary be perceived as a more impartial insti-
tution.' In the wake of the Rodney King verdicts and -the
outcry of many who believe that a fair trial is unobtainable, it
is easy to see that perceptions of our judicial system are strong-
ly held. Diversification may help change these perceptions.
While some might believe that numbers should be increased
as a matter of "fair play" and proportional representation,'
some use the proportional representation argument to criticize
affirmative action programs.0 5 Judge Wald maintains that di-
versifying the judiciary is not about any group having a right to
proportional representation. 6 She asserts "it is a matter of
injecting into the appointment process, consistent with the
highest standards of individual capabilities, a reasonable mix of
the racial, gender, and ethnic backgrounds of the citizens who
will be affected by the rulings of the courts." °7
Opponents of affirmative action have argued that selecting
judges based on gender and racial characteristics would dimin-
102. Senator Leahy cites as a disturbing issue nominees who belong or have be-
longed to discriminatory clubs. He uses as an example Shannon T. Mason, Jr., whose
nomination was considered by the Judiciary Committee in 1988. Mason had been a
member of the James River Country Club in Newport News, Virginia for sixteen
years. In its fifty-six-year history, the club had never admitted a black member. Ma-
son admitted he knew of its discriminatory policies but did nothing about it. Mason
resigned from the club two weeks before the hearings, but his nomination was
blocked when local black lawyers opposed it. Leahy, supra note 21, at 28-29.
103. Renee Loth, Weld's Hunt for Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1991, at A19.
See also Tobias, supra note 47 at 177 (listing citizens' perceptions of the neutrality of
the judicial system as one benefit to increasing the number of female federal judges).
104. John Gruhl et al., Women as Policy-Makers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 308, 309 (1981).





ish the quality of the judiciary."8 Judge Wald does not believe
the quality of candidates need be sacrificed in order to bring to
the judiciary those with "unique experiences and sensitivities of
different sectors of our nation ...-.. 'o9 In fact, many believe
there is a highly-qualified pool of women and men of color who
would make positive contributions as judges. 10 We just may
have to look beyond the large law firms to other areas such as
public interest and academia to find excellent lawyers who have
been previously overlooked."'
B. Substantive Effects
The final issue is whether any substantive policy changes are
effectuated by including women, and men of color on the bench.
Certainly, many people perceive that women, and men of color
are more connected to the people who are being judged.12
Some also believe that policies will change only if white male
dominance is eroded. Barbara Arnwine, executive director of the
National Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law,
is calling for more black appointments, observing that as the
Reagan-Bush era closes, we are left with a federal bench that is
"hostile to civil rights."' Others feel that women are needed
on the bench to eliminate gender bias from court outcomes."'
Regardless of what people might perceive the influence of
gender or race to be, is there any measurable difference in the
decisions made? Political scientists have conducted studies with
less than dramatic results. One study of trial judges predicted
that women would be more lenient than men; however, no
support was found for this hypothesis."' Interestingly, the on-
108. See, e.g., Walker & Barrow, supra note 45, at 598.
109. Wald, supra note 18, at 19.
110. See Loth, supra note 103 at A19; see also Wahl, supra note 12 at 156.
111. See, e.g., Halpern & Macrory, supra note 20, at E21 (noting that President
Carter's nominations included only token numbers of lawyers with careers dedicated
to representing the indigent, minorities and others).
112. Karst, supra note 28, at 1958; see also Loth, supra note 102, at A19.
113. Williams, supra note 19, at B2.
114. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 43, at 160 (citing a study by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts).
115. Gruhl, supra note 104, at 319.
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ly significant difference found was that women were more strict
in sentencing female defendants."6
Another study by Walker and Barrow considered both gender
and racial differences, using matched pairs of male/female and
black/white judges after President Carter's appointments." 7
They similarly failed to find statistically significant differences
in decisionmaking."5 However, the authors of this study ad-
mitted that the number of cases analyzed was limited, con-
stricting the potential for behavioral analyses."'
It is significant that the samples in each study were small.
Obviously, until more women and men of color are represented,
it will be difficult to collect data on decisionmaking. It is also
significant that we do not know what one judge would do com-
pared to another had each heard the same cases. In addition,
we do not know if the judges differed in how they arrived at
their decisions.
The political process of selecting judges is also usually over-
looked as a variable. Interestingly, Walker and Barrow did
mention the possible influence of the selection process, stating
that it might screen out candidates with other than convention-
al viewpoints.' They accurately noted that "the judges stud-
ied . . ., be they traditional or non-traditional, were generally
suggested by white, male legislators and [state] party offi-
cials . . . , nominated by a white, male president, and con-
finned by a white, male Senate." This leads to the conclu-
sion that increased gender and racial diversification beyond
tokenism may indeed have substantive policy ramifications.
116. Id. at 320. It is important to note that because men far outnumbered women
in the sample used for this study (as is the case in most jurisdictions), men decided
over 82% of the more than 30,000 felony cases studied. Id. at 313 n.11.
117. Walker & Barrow, supra note 46, at 599.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 615.
120. Id. Walker and Barrow further recognized that "[m]inority persons selected for
judgeships may well tend to be 'safe' candidates who are generally supportive of the
system." Id. See also BRUCE WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUSTICE 65-87 (1987).
Wright argues that the few token black judges "are the arbitrary and capricious prod-




Increased diversity will lead to more creative solutions to
problems. The "newcomers" to the system have less stake in the
status quo and will therefore be willing to reach beyond the
confines of the present system to resolve civil disputes or levy
criminal punishments. A case in point is New York State Judge
Helen Freedman who recently sentenced New York City offi-
cials to spend a night at the office for the homeless with report-
edly deplorable conditions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to analyze the role of a judge and
the influence of gender and race in terms of perspective, impar-
tiality and morality. It is concluded that, generally, a judge's
perspective does matter and bears a crucial relationship to
those being judged. Recognizing perspective is essential to both
independent judgment and a fair hearing for all sides.
Apart from this general observation, it is submitted that
gender and race are two factors which affect one's own view of
the world. Some experiences are such that their outcomes de-
pend on gender and race. The fact a judge brings these experi-
ences to the bench does not compromise impartiality. It is the
realization of one's vantage point which makes independent
judgment possible.
This holds even when considering the broad range of discre-
tion afforded judges in many situations. We employ judges to
evaluate facts and to reach conclusions in a wide range of dis-
putes. Judges also conduct statutory and constitutional interpre-
tation. In some situations judges may evaluate the facts in a
certain way in order to choose a particular rule of law to apply.
A judge's notions of fairness and justice may play a role in
decisionmaking, particularly when equity concerns are present-
ed. The moral resources of a judge also will affect
decisionmaking, as well as the interpretation of laws and the
Constitution.'
122. Derrick Z. Jackson, See How the Rich Like Poverty, RICH. TImEs DISPATCH,
Nov. 28, 1992, at All.
123. For a discussion of the influence of gender on views of conventional morality
and constitutional interpretation, see Wald, supra note 89, at 10-18.
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Certainly, diversifying the judiciary may lead to ideological
diversity, and we may see this manifested in decisionmaking.
However, impartiality is not compromised if we maintain realis-
tic expectations of our judges, and dispel the notion that there
is one universal truth. To do this we must always keep in mind
the fact that everyone has a perspective, and particularly that
the dominant group has a perspective which pervades present
judicial decisionmaking. From this posture, ideological diversity
is a positive step, not a threatening one. It is merely the result
of expanding the type of qualifications deemed meritorious and
selecting judges from a deeper pool. It is this approach to the
process which is important. "Ideological correctness ... should
not function as the dispositive, or even principal, qualification
for nomination."'24
At the heart of law is morality, and diversity will be a posi-
tive influence on the moral decisions judges are increasingly
being asked to make. While certainly not advocating that judg-
es set their own moral agendas, the injection of personal moral-
ity into the process is inevitable, especially in light of an evolv-
ing community morality. Our society is nothing if not ever-
changing, and with it morality changes as well.
Finally, diversity may lead to creative problem-solving. De-
spite the far-reaching nature of this conclusion, diversity will
touch people's lives in a human way. Judicial decisions affect
human beings, and some members of our society need to be
affected in a positive way before they drop out all together.
Previously silenced groups deserve a chance to be heard. In-
creased diversity in our courtrooms will also go a long way
toward eliminating institutional bias, 2 ' a prerequisite to en-
suring all voices are heard and providing for solutions to prob-
lems. However, token diversity will not achieve these goals.
Identifying self-confidence as a factor in one's willingness to beinnovative, Martin has commented that women may be influ-
enced by their token status and hesitate to take nonconforming
actions.'26
124. Tobias, supra note 48, at 182.
125. See Sherry, supra note 43, at 160-62 (arguing that the mere fact that women
are participating in the adjudicative process may help alleviate problems of discrimi-
nation).
126. Martin, supra note 41, at 207.
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Those in positions of power are increasingly recognizing the
benefits of diversity. Some progress is being made, as evidenced
by the confirmation of the second woman to the United States
Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsberg. With heightened political
pressure, the goal of diversity may become a reality. However,
as there are critics of the increasing calls for diversity, the pur-
pose of this inquiry is to address why diversifying the judiciary
is important. We must now insure that when judges are chosen,
the net cast to trawl for talent is wide enough to include
women, and men of color. Only then will we achieve true,
rather than token, diversity.
Susan Moloney Smith






African- Hispanic- Asian- Disabled
Women Americans Americans Americans Americans
Circuits Circuit District Circuit District Circuit District Circuit District Circuit District
DC 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1st 0 2 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0
2nd 1 6 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
3rd 3 7 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0
4th 1 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
5th 2 6 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0
6th 2 7 2 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
7th 1 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
8th 0 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1
9th 5 15 2 6- 1 5- 1 5 0 0
10th 2 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
11th 2 8 1 4 0 3 0 0 0 0
Federalt 2 0 0 0 0
Total F23] 68 9 32 3I~ 29 1 1 [51 0 1 2
Supreme 2 1 0 0 0
Court
Grand 93 42 32 6 2
Total (11.1%) (5.0%) (3.8%) (.7%) (.2%)
Source: Alliance for Justice
Includes one woman.
= Includes two women.
t Federal Circuit does not have a district court.
Percentage of the identified group in the federal judiciary.
There are 837 Article III active, lifetime positions in the federal judiciary: 9 seats on the
Supreme Court, 179 positions among the circuit courts of appeals and 649 district court
positions.
